Nonprofit organizations may predominate when output quality is difficult to monitor. Hospital care has this characteristic. This study compared program cost and quality of care for Medicare patients hospitalized following onset of four common conditions by hospital ownership. Payments on behalf of Medicare patients admitted to for-profit hospitals during the first 6 months following a health shock were higher than for those admitted to other hospitals. With quality measured in terms of survival, changes in functional and cognitive status, and living arrangements, we found no differences in outcomes by hospital ownership.
Introduction
The hospital industry provides a useful laboratory for comparing behavior of organizations having different ownership forms. Unlike most other sectors, for-profit organizations constitute a minority of firms supplying hospital care in the US and in all developed countries. In the US, such hospitals constituted only 15% of all nonfederal short-term general hospitals in 1996 (American Hospital Association, 1998) . By contrast, 59% of hospitals were private nonprofits, and the rest were operated by governments, primarily local govern-ments, or special government authorities. 1 Another stylized fact is that growth of for-profit hospitals' market share has been moderate. Although for-profit chains have grown both numerically and in influence since they first appeared in the late 1960s, the share of small independent for-profit hospitals has declined.
Critics of for-profit hospitals voice several concerns: lack of community benefit; cream skimming; diversion; and exploitation (Hyman, 1998) . Lack of community benefit refers to a claim that for-profit hospitals do not produce their share of public goods, such as charity care, medical education, and research. 2 Cream skimming refers to an allegation that for-profit hospitals locate in geographic areas where affluent people live and/or limit care to profitable services and/or patients and suggests that the hospital the patient selects may be endogenous. 3 'Diversion' means that for-profit hospitals allocate too much to administration, marketing, and taxes, all of which represent leakages of resources that could be devoted to patient care. 4 Finally, by 'exploitation,' it is alleged that for-profit hospitals charge higher prices, channel demand to their facilities, and may even induce demand.
Since the early 1980s, US hospitals have lost a great deal of their power to set price for inpatient care. This change reflects the changes in government insurance payment practices and growth of various forms of managed care. These firms still have latitude in selecting patient mix, in the quantities of services used to treat specific conditions (quality), and in accounting practices that potentially affect the amounts they are paid. Most recently, it has been alleged that the largest for-profit hospital firm, Columbia-HCA, has bilked the Medicare program by billing for services that were not provided or not needed and by using various accounting loopholes to increase payments from Medicare. Also by aligning itself with local physicians and other suppliers of service, referral patterns and cash flows to other health care providers have changed (increased) as well. 5 This issue is not only important because of the specific allegations made against this firm, but also there is some concern that this behavior may generalize to other for-profit hospital companies. For this reason among others, hospital conversions to the for-profit form are receiving much greater scrutiny by state attorneys' general and others than heretofore (see, e.g. Cutler and Horwitz, 1998; Horwitz, 1997; .
In this study, we revisit an old question with much better data: how does hospital ownership affect performance in terms of program cost and quality? In this analysis, we used data on a national panel of elderly patients who were admitted to nonfederal, short-term general hospitals for one of four major health shocks. We obtained Medicare claims data for these patients for 1982-1995, which were merged with household survey data. 1 In terms of average daily patient census adjusted for outpatient output, shares in 1996 were: 71% private nonprofit; 10% for-profit and 18% government (American Hospital Association, 1998) . 2 Since there are virtually no for-profit teaching hospitals, the claim about medical education and research is valid, assuming that such cross subsidies are desirable. Differences in provision of charity care between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are minor on average. Public hospitals provide more charity care than private facilities (see Sloan, 1998) .
3 Norton and Staiger (1994) found that for-profit hospitals do locate where effective demand for care is high. However, given location, the propensity to provide charity care was the same for nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.
4 See Woolhandler et al. (1993) on this point. The critics have not measured the marginal benefit in terms of other cost savings to the hospitals from extra administrative cost, nor the public benefit accruing from taxes.
5 See, e.g. Eichenwald (1997) .
Section 2 discusses the rationale for alternatives to the for-profit ownership form for hospitals and motivates our empirical analysis. In Section 3, we discuss our data and in Section 4, our empirical specification and estimation methods. Section 5 presents our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes the study.
Ownership form and hospital behavior
Hospital care is distinctive in two important respects. First, the product purchaser is often not well informed about the quality of the service being purchased and frequently is less informed than the supplier. Moreover, the consumer often cannot experience the quality of the good. In other words, hospital care is a credence good (Emons, 1997) . Second, consumers almost always pay out-of-pocket much less than the marginal cost of their care, and parties other than direct consumers foot the rest of the bill. Rather than provide care directly, governments primarily pay for care through public insurance.
Nonprofit firms may earn profits. In fact, many, including hospitals, do. Rather nonprofit firms are precluded from distributing profits to persons who exercise control over the firm. Although such firms can pay reasonable compensation to suppliers of inputs, resulting earnings cannot be distributed. Such earnings must be retained and used by the firm. Because of the nondistribution constraint, nonprofit firms have no owners, that is, persons who control and share in residual earnings (Hansmann, 1996, p. 228) . Arrow (1963) explained the dominance of nonprofits in the hospital sector as a response to uncertainty and incomplete markets for risk. Because such organizations are not pure profit-seekers, they would not fully exploit their market power vis-à-vis a patient who experienced a major health shock. Weisbrod (1988) extended this concept to nonprofits more generally. For some services, customers have difficulty evaluating and rewarding performance. Often, in such cases, the customer may never know for sure what would have happened if the service had not been performed or if it had been purchased from another seller. When output is difficult for the customer to measure, Weisbrod argued, it may not be efficient to reward easily monitored forms of behavior, but allow for rewarding, or at least be more neutral to rewarding, less easily monitorable behavior. This softening of incentives is done by attenuating property rights to earnings and various bans in charters of nonprofits against private inurement of managers. As a consequence, firms will engage in behaviors that would not be demanded if customers were fully informed. The nonprofit form is efficient to the extent that the increase in valuable behaviors offsets other responses that decrease welfare. Since property rights are attenuated, managers may 'purchase' more nonpecuniary benefits than managers of a profit-seeking firm would, such as nice offices, less supervision of employees, and prestige.
A similar argument has been made by Hart et al. (1997) about circumstances under which government would provide a service directly or contract out for its provision. A government employee who manages a public enterprise cannot fully appropriate the gains from cost-reducing innovations. Hence, such a manager would be less likely to cut cost which in turn might adversely affect hard-to-monitor quality. In general, the larger are the potential adverse consequences of cost cutting on quality, the stronger is the argument for direct public provision. In the context of hospital care, governments decide between direct public provision in the form of public hospitals and contracting out by implementing health insurance programs to purchase care on behalf of its beneficiaries, such as Medicare in the US does for persons over age 65 and other groups. In this study, we examined two dimensions of hospital behavior: (1) effects of ownership on how much Medicare pays for patients who have experienced various health shocks; and (2) effects of ownership on health outcomes of Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized following these same health shocks.
Medicare beneficiaries pay virtually nothing for hospital care, and the price of other Medicare-covered services is appreciably reduced as well. A profit-seeking firm would have a stronger incentive to maximize cash flows from Medicare than would a private nonprofit or a public hospital. Increased cash flows may be accomplished by: changing the way that hospitals classify patient diagnoses; increasing use of hospital care not covered by Medicares fixed per case payment system about which beneficiaries are indifferent because they face a zero out-of-pocket price at the margin; and vertically integrating, that is, by contracting formally or informally with nursing homes or home health agencies and/or with physicians who refer patients to their hospitals.
An organizational difference between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals is the relationship of hospitals and doctors. The latter are typically not employees of the hospital, but rather are granted privileges to work there (Pauly, 1980) . However, the alignment of incentives is somewhat different for for-profit hospitals. Some for-profit hospitals are owned outright by doctors. More recently, hospital companies have given some local doctors an explicit share of residual hospital income.
Policing referrals and coding practices is costly to Medicare. Therefore, monitoring by Medicare is incomplete. Given the for-profits' greater incentive to maximize profit, Medicare may spend more when the patient is admitted to a for-profit hospital, cet par.
Further, there may be a difference in quality. Health outcomes depend on quality of care received. Some forms of hospital quality may be easily observed by patients, such as food, size of the room, and even many of the tests that are performed during the stay. Others forms of quality are frequently more difficult for patients to gauge, for example, the quality of hospital personnel. A profit-seeking hospital may provide high quality on easily monitored dimensions, but cut corners on hard-to-monitor quality measures. For this reason, health outcomes dependent on hard-to-measure quality dimensions might be worse if the patient is hospitalized in a for-profit hospital. For example, we may not expect to find differences in short-term mortality, but we might expect to find differences in mortality and in health and ability to perform various activities, months or even years after a health shock.
Data
The study sample was drawn from the National Long-Term Care Survey (NLTCS) which is a panel study fielded in 1982 fielded in , 1984 fielded in , 1989 fielded in , and 1994 Medicare beneficiaries were included in the data base for at least some time. NLTCS drew its sample from Medicare enrollment records for persons 65 years of age and older. A brief screener interview containing questions about basic personal characteristics and functional status was administered to all beneficiaries. Based on responses to the screener, full interviews were conducted with persons who reported having at least one limitation in activities of daily living (ADLs) or in instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). Respondents lived in the community or in other facilities, most notably in nursing homes. The NLTCS collected detailed information on functional and cognitive status, health conditions, demographic characteristics of the family including potential caregivers, education, race/ethnicity, and income, including sources of income and wealth.
These data from NLTCS were merged with data from other sources. First, data on all Medicare claims, inpatient, outpatient, Part B physician, home health, skilled nursing facility, and hospice from 1982 through 1995 were merged with all individuals screened by NLTCS in any year (Manton et al., 1995) . Each claim included information on diagnoses and amounts billed and paid by Medicare. Using hospital identifiers on the claim, we could identify the hospitals which in turn allowed us to assign ownership codes using data from the American Hospital Association. Dates of deaths for all NLTCS respondents were verified from Medicare enrollment records.
For purposes of this analysis, we selected persons admitted to hospitals for stays of 91 days or less to nonfederal, short-term general hospitals with primary diagnoses of hip fracture, stroke, coronary heart disease, or congestive heart failure. These are frequent reasons for hospitalization, especially among the elderly. Hip fracture and stroke often lead to chronic disability and quicker deaths. Coronary heart disease and congestive heart failure markedly reduce life expectancy and are also common conditions among the elderly. By selecting specific conditions, we were far better able to control for casemix. We selected the first admission for these condition that occurred starting in 1983 through 1995. Thus, a particular Medicare beneficiary only appeared in our sample at most once. Since we had Medicare claims data starting in 1982 and the NLTCS asked about conditions during the preceding year, we had a minimum of 2-year look-back period for ascertaining a first admissions for a particular condition. This yielded a gross sample of 9,640. We dropped observations for which total Medicare payment was zero (N = 40) or exceeded US$ 100,000 during the first 6 months following the index admission (N = 22). We lost 267 observations because the primary sampling unit (PSU) identifier was missing. A PSU in NLTCS was a group of counties for residents of metropolitan areas corresponding to a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area or a county for residents of rural areas. In total, there were 173 PSUs located throughout the US. We dropped 898 observations because of missing values on one or more market variables, yielding a net sample of 8,403. One reason for a missing market variable was that there was no hospital in the PSU.
Full NLTCS interviews were only administered to respondents who reported at least one limitation in ADL or IADL that had lasted or was expected to last at least 3 months. Rather than exclude observations for which a full interview was not available, for the few explanatory variables for which data were only available from the full interview, we set missing values to zero and defined a separate explanatory binary variable to account for these missing values. The alternative, excluding the explanatory variables based on the full interview, yielded almost identical results.
The full pooled sample was used to analyze Medicare payments and mortality. Numbers of observations for the rest of the analysis were smaller. 6 We classified hospitals into three mutually exclusive categories with numbers of observations in parentheses: for-profit (N = 1,164), government (N = 1,324), and private nonprofit hospitals (N = 5,915).
Empirical specification

Overview
Our empirical analysis assessed the effect of ownership on Medicare payments and on quality of care. Our payment measures included not only the amount paid for the index admission but also downstream payments up to 6 months following the health shock. On quality, we examined the effect of ownership on mortality and measures of functioning for those who survived to the next NLTCS interview.
Dependent variables
To measure Medicare payments, we specified two dependent variables: (1) total Medicare payments during the first 6 months after the shock; and (2) total Medicare payments during the first 6 months less Medicare payments incurred during the beneficiary's index hospital stay. In addition to prospectively-determined payments, payments during the index admission included physician Part B payments for services rendered during the stay, payments for care excluded from the Medicare Prospective Payment System, such as for rehabilitation, and Medicare subsidies for teaching and for disproportionate share. All monetarily-expressed variables were converted to 1994 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, all items. Because payments were strongly right-skewed, we specified dependent payment variables as the natural logarithm of payments.
The second dependent variable was analyzed to assess the impact of initial hospitalization on downstream payments. Some hospitals may offer more intensive care which produces savings in care, such as lower rehospitalization rates or institutional care, following discharge from the first hospital. Alternatively, hospitals may not offer higher intensity, but rather may refer patients to service providers with which they have contractual relationships, thus raising Medicare payments after discharge. For the analysis with the second dependent variable, we dropped 794 observations with zero values.
Medicare payments for index hospitalizations could vary for a particular condition because (1) of differences in coding practices among hospitals; (2) payments for services not covered in the basic Medicare prospective price, such as for rehabilitation; (3) Part B payments billed for services provided during the hospital stay; and (4) various Medicare subsidies to hospitals for teaching, disproportionate share, and outlier payment subsidies.
We measured the probability of death at 1 month, 6 months, and 1 year following the index shock. To gauge whether some types of hospitals were more successful in keeping patients out of nursing homes, we specified a binary dependent variable equal to one if the beneficiary lived in the community rather than in a nursing home at the NLTCS interview after the shock. Our analysis assessed the extent to which the shock, ownership of the hospital to which the patient was initially admitted, and other factors, discussed below under 'other explanatory variables,' affected living arrangements.
Similarly, to investigate changes in functional status from the date of NLTCS interview before the index shock to date of the interview after this shock, we specified equations with dependent variables for whether or not the number of ADLs increased after versus before the shock, and whether or not the number of IADLs increased. For each, there were a maximum of six limitations. ADLs refer to deficits in performing very personal activities, such as bathing and eating; IADLs refer to performing other daily activities, such as shopping and doing laundry. 7 To measure cognitive status, we estimated an equation with a binary dependent variable to represent cognitive functioning. We used the 10 question Short Portable Mental Status Questionnaire administered as part of the NLTCS interview as a measure of cognitive status (Pfeiffer, 1975) . A person was classified as cognitively aware if s/he answered seven or more questions correctly. 8
Ownership
Our analysis focused on the role of ownership of the hospital to which the beneficiary was first admitted. We used the three categories described above, with for-profit hospitals, the omitted reference group.
Other explanatory variables
Other explanatory fell into six categories: demographic/income; health pre-shock; primary diagnosis at index admission; market characteristics; hospital characteristics; and time. Demographic variables were age at the date of the index shock, gender, years of schooling, race, being married at the NLTCS interview before the shock, and a binary variable indicating beneficiaries first screened after 1984 (new cohort). We also included a variable for total household income at the NLTCS interview before the shock, inflated to 1994 dollars using the CPI, all items.
Included in the health pre-shock category were a binary variable indicating whether the person lived in the community (versus a nursing home), number of ADLs, whether or not the person was cognitively aware, and a binary for lack of bowel and/or bladder control, all as reported at the NLTCS interview before the shock. On average, the previous interview was between two and three years before the shock occurred. For primary diagnosis at index admission, we included a risk-adjuster (comorbidity) index used by Medicare and others to forecast future payments on behalf of the individual (DxCG, 1996; Ellis et al., 1996) . Diagnoses other than the primary reason for the index admission were reflected in this comorbidity score which allowed for comparison of patients with divergent conditions in terms of future expected Medicare-financed resource use. We also included binary variables to account for heterogeneity among primary diagnoses within the four broad diagnostic categories. 9 Thus, considering all the adjustments, we were able to capture casemix and other patient characteristics much more precisely than in the vast majority of prior studies.
Market characteristics variables were defined for the respondent's PSU. These were population per square mile, the Herfindahl Index based on beds, Medicare hospital wage index, HMO market share, and hospital beds per 100 population corresponding to the respondent's PSU. Hospital characteristics variables were number of hospital beds and teaching status. The latter was defined as hospitals with any interns or residents. Data on hospital characteristics were obtained from Medicare Cost Reports for the year in which the index admission occurred. Finally, we included a set of binary variables for the year in which the index admission occurred. Results for the time binaries are not shown in the tables.
Instrumental variables (IVs)
We selected the following variables as IVs: state nonprofit hospital market share in the year of admission, state government hospital market share in the year of admission, market shares squared, and a cross product term of the two shares. We used hospital ownership market shares as instruments because they serve as proxies for the differential distances to different types of hospitals for the patients (see, e.g. McClellan et al., 1994 for discussion of distance between hospitals and patients as an IV). A patient will prefer a closer hospital, cet. par. Conditional on the location of patients and hospitals, this differential distance measure is plausible uncorrelated with unobservable individual patient-level variables, including omitted health characteristics.
A potential problem with our identification strategy is that state market shares may reflect omitted preferences of state residents, e.g., preferences for post hospital care, although patients within a state (especially the large ones, such as California, Texas, New York, and Florida) are likely to be very heterogeneous on this score. We have reduced this potential identification failure by including a large number of individual and area controls to our main equations. We additionally performed several overidentification tests and also estimated the model using corporate income tax, property tax, cost of capital, and fraction of population over 65 as instruments. These instruments are all plausibly exogenous, but had less predictive power. 10
Estimation and specification tests
When the dependent variable was continuous, we estimated the model using ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (TSLS), a generalized method of moment (GMM/IV) estimator and an instrumental variable estimator using a multinomial logit (ML/IV). When 9 For stroke, we distinguished between hemorraghic and ischemic strokes. Likewise, for coronary heart disease, separate binary variables were specified for heart attacks, angina pectoris/unstable angina, and other ischemic heart disease. For congestive heart failure, we distinguished between congestive heart failure that stemmed from renal disease and/or hypertension (congestive heart failure with renal/hypertensive disease) and congestive heart failure from other causes (congestive heart failure other). For hip fractures, we distinguished between pertrochanteric hip fractures and other fractures which included transcervical fractures and unspecified hip fracture locations, the former being the omitted reference group. 10 Results using the latter set of instruments will be discussed further below. the dependent variable was dichotomous, we estimated the model using logit regressions and the GMM/IV method.
This GMM/IV method minimizes the expression below with respect to β:
where
, X the n × k matrix of explanatory variables, and Z the n × l matrix of instruments with l ≥ k. For the payment analysis, Y was specified as the natural logarithm of payments and h(X, β) = X β. In our analysis of outcomes, Y was a dichotomous variable and h(X i , β) = exp(X i β)/(1 + exp(X i β)). Thus, we assumed logit probabilities. If W is the identity matrix, the GMM/IV method is equivalent to TSLS in the linear case. This approach has several advantages: (1) it is very general and can be used with continuous and dichotomous dependent variables; (2) GMM provides a very simple test for the overidentification restrictions. Furthermore, specification tests for the TSLS have well known asymptotic and finite sample properties; (3) the estimates have desirable asymptotic properties and the variance covariance matrix is given by
where G = −∂h(X, β)/∂β. This variance covariance matrix is consistently estimated using a two-step procedure described in Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) allowing for heteroscedasticity of unknown form. The main disadvantage is that applying GMM and TSLS to our model is equivalent to assuming that the ownership probabilities are linear and independent which is obviously false since the ownership categories are mutually exclusive. For the payment equations, we also estimated the models using multinomial logit predicted probabilities as IVs (ML/IV). The multinomial logit probability has the advantage of accounting for the fact that ownership types are mutually exclusive.
In the payment equation, we transformed our dependent variable into natural logarithms. All of our estimation methods will produce consistent estimates of the effects of the explanatory variables on the logarithm of the dependent variable. Because we were interested in determining the effects of ownership on payments rather than log payments, we first calculated the predicted values of payment for each ownership type using the following equation:
exp ê i is the smearing factor. We then calculated the marginal effects of government and nonprofit ownership by taking the ratios of the predicted values with respect to for profit and subtracting one from each of these ratios. We obtained standard errors of these predicted values by bootstrapping and the delta method. This procedure produces unbiased estimates of the marginal effects under the presence of heteroscedasticity by ownership type (Manning, 1998) .
We performed several specification tests. First, we tested for the overidentification restrictions. For the GMM/IV estimator, we used the value of q to test for overidentification (q-test), which has a chi-square distribution with l-k degrees of freedom. A large test statistic for the overidentification restrictions may imply either that the model is specified incorrectly, or the instruments are invalid. Second, we tested for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
Results
Sample characteristics
Mean Medicare payments for the first 6 months following the shock were US$ 13,500 (1994 dollars). Of this amount, US$ 7,600 was spent by Medicare on services other than for the index hospital admission, US$ 8,100 with the zero values excluded (Table 1 ). In our analysis sample, 14% of admissions were to for-profit, 70% to private nonprofit, and 16% to government hospitals. Compared to national output shares in 1996, our sample overrepresented for-profits and underrepresented government facilities. 11 By 1 year, 27% had died. About two-fifths of respondents experienced increases in the numbers of ADLs and IADLs, comparing ADLs/IADLs at the NLTCS interview after the index shock with ADLs/IADLs at the interview before the shock occurred. On average, respondents were 78 years of age. Most (60%) were female. Their mean household income was US$ 16,800. Table 2 reports partial results from our analysis of Medicare payments. In the first stage, we performed multinomial logit analysis of the ownership of the hospital the patient selected for the index admission. The coefficients and standard errors presented in the table are for variables excluded from the main equations. Results using other estimators were similar, and therefore, are not presented. All the variables presented in Table 2 have statistically significant impacts on choice of hospital ownership type. Evaluated at their mean values, increasing each of the market shares had a positive marginal effect on the probability of being admitted to that type of hospital.
First-stage results
We also used an alternative set of IVs (see Table 3 ). Of the four IVs in this specification, only three, the property tax, cost of capital to hospitals, and population group over 65, were statistically significant at conventional levels. All of the signs on the coefficients were plausible. The overall explanatory power was 28% less than for the estimated equation presented in Table 2 .
Specification tests
Our q-tests (not reported) did not reject the null hypothesis that our model was correctly specified for either the payments or the outcome analysis, using GMM. Because the q-test does not have good finite sample properties (Imbens et al., 1995) , we also applied a Basmann 11 Of course, our sample drew from Medicare beneficiaries and admissions for four tracer conditions. overidentification test in the TSLS payment analysis and did not reject the null hypothesis of appropriate specification. Using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity, we rejected the null hypothesis of exogeneity of total Medicare payments and total Medicare payments less payments for the index admission, but the tests did not reject the null hypothesis at conventional levels of statistical significance for health outcomes. Therefore, we relied on IV methods for both payments dependent variables and on logit analysis for outcomes.
Payments
Results on Medicare payments were very similar with alternative approaches for accounting for endogeneity. We present full results using GMM/IV (Table 4) .
Payments made on behalf of patients admitted to government and nonprofit facilities were lower than for those admitted to for-profits with both dependent variables. Both ownership parameter estimates were statistically significant at the 1% level for the analysis of total payments and payments less payments for the index hospitalization.
Many of the other factors had statistically significant impacts on such payments with specifics varying somewhat between the two equations. For total payments during the first 6 months, statistically significant coefficients were obtained for: age (−); male (+); education (+); white race (−); living in the community and number of ADLs before the shock (+); comorbidity index (+); most variables describing primary diagnosis at index shock; time (+); Herfindahl index (−); hospital wage index (+); HMO share (−); hospital beds (+), and teaching status (+). The result for population density reflects collinearity between density and the Herfindahl Index.
In Table 5 , we show marginal effects and standard errors for the ownership variables based on alternative estimators. Because the smearing factor for profit hospitals was considerably lower than the one estimated for government and nonprofit hospitals (0.979 versus 2.131 and 1.385 for the total payment case), the marginal effects were considerably lower than were the estimates that did not account for heteroscedasticity. Using OLS, total payments were lower for patients admitted to government facilities -8% lower than for for-profits. Using TSLS, multinomial logit, or GMM, the differential between governments' and for-profits' total payments was somewhat higher. The differentials ranged from 8 to 11%. Marginal effects of nonprofit status were around 5-6% lower than for profit hospitals. In addition, we experimented with an alternative set of instruments (see Section 4.5) with total Medicare and total minus index admission payments as dependent variables; marginal effects using the alternative IVs for total Medicare payments were −0.090 for government and −0.088 for nonprofit hospitals, very similar to the other estimates presented in Table 5 . For total 6 month payments less payments for the index hospital admission, differentials by ownership were larger than for total payments. The results imply that Medicare spent 9-16% less on behalf of patients admitted to government facilities than for those beneficiaries admitted to for-profit facilities. Comparing nonprofits and for-profits, payments on behalf of patients, for-profits were 12% higher with OLS. Corresponding differentials accounting for endogeneity were somewhat higher, 14%. As explained above, we dropped the zero values for analysis of this dependent variable. To determine if there were systematic patterns by ownership in whether or not there was a zero value for the second dependent variable, we estimated an equation with a dependent variable equal to one for zero payments and zero for positive payments. Ownership had no effect on this dependent variable.
Mortality
None of the ownership variables had statistically significant impacts on mortality even at the 10% level (Table 6 ). 12 Also, the associated marginal effects were small. Only one of the marginal effects was as high as 1% (−0.012) for government hospitals, 1-year mortality. Most of the explanatory variables for demographic/income, health, pre-shock, and primary diagnosis at index admission had statistically significant impacts on mortality with plausible directions of effect. By contrast, few of the coefficients on the market or hospital variables were statistically significant. An exception was the HMO market share variable in the analysis of mortality at 6 months and 1 year which was negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Probability of living in the community after the shock
Conditional on surviving to the next NLTCS interview, 82% lived in the community with the rest living in a nursing home. Results are reported in the first column of Table 7 . We found that persons admitted to government and nonprofit hospitals for treatment of their shocks were less likely to live in the community at the NLTCS interview following the shock. But the results were not significant and the marginal effects small (−0.009 and −0.007).
Results for other explanatory variables (not shown) were plausible, and many coefficients were statistically significant at conventional levels.
Activities of daily living, instrumental activities of daily living, and being cognitively aware
As noted above, many persons had worse functional status after the shock, and the vast majority of respondents were not cognitively aware at the NLTCS interview after the shock. 13 None of the coefficients on ownership were statistically significant at conventional levels in our analysis of changed in functional status and of good cognitive status (Table 7) .
Conclusion
Adjusting for endogeneity, we found that for-profit hospitals were more expensive to Medicare, especially in terms of payments other than for index hospitalizations. The higher cash flow to for-profits plausibly reflects their greater incentive to maximize reimbursements from payers by various means including formal and informal contractual relationships with other suppliers of health care services.
It is plausible that for-profit firms would have a greater propensity to locate where they could make more money. Empirical evidence from past research supports this view (Norton and Staiger, 1994) . This result suggests that hospital location decisions and, therefore, state market shares by ownership may be endogenous. However, when we used an alternative set of instruments not subject to this problem, including property and corporate income tax 13 The number of IADLs was not obtained for residents of nursing homes.
rates and cost of capital to hospitals, we obtained similar results. Also, the OLS marginal effects were very similar to those obtained using various IV approaches.
Above, we explained that nonprofit organizations may exist because they soften incentives to produce easily monitored outputs and to under producing hard-to-measure ones. In other words, such organizations may be less likely to cut corners at the expense of quality that customers cannot observe. Applying this concept to hospitals, a profit-seeking firm might cut corners on care that has beneficial effects downstream. Outcomes analyzed in this study clearly fit in the 'hard-to-monitor' category. For example, mortality during the hospital stay or soon thereafter may be partly observable, but mortality differences several months after discharge would be very hard for customers to trace. On balance, hospital ownership does not seem to make a difference on quality.
Of course, there may be other hard-to-measure outcomes that may be relevant, but we have studied the major ones. Elsewhere, we assessed the probability of readmission to a hospital for the same diagnosis and found no differences by ownership .
The vast majority of cost comparisons between for-profit hospitals and those with other types of ownership have been limited to hospital care. To our knowledge, only one other study has assessed the impact of admission by ownership type on costs or payments for other kinds of personal health services. Silverman et al. (1999) compared total per capita Medicare spending in areas served by for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. They analyzed rates of Medicare spending for small geographic areas in 1989, 1992, and 1995, adjusting for other potential determinants of spending, such as age, sex, race, region of the US, urbanization, and the Medicare mortality rate. In contrast to our study, the observational unit was a small market area. Their analysis was not limited to particular tracer conditions. They did not account for possible endogeneity. Overall, the authors found that rates of per capita Medicare spending and increases in spending rates were greater in areas served by for-profit hospitals than in areas served by nonprofit hospitals. Their results on Medicare payments are qualitatively similar to ours. Extrapolating their estimates in a comment on this article, Woolhandler and Himmelstein (1999) concluded that if all US hospitals had been for-profit in 1995, Medicare would have spent US$ 24.3 billion more than if there had been no for-profit hospitals.
Empirical studies comparing public and private for-profit enterprises have been conducted for a variety of industries, especially electricity generation and distribution, water, and refuse collection. Overall, the evidence on comparative performance has been mixed. 14 Based on their review, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) concluded that competition in the enterprise's product market may be a more important determinant of performance than ownership per se. 15 Unfortunately, there is little evidence on comparative performance of private for-profit and nonprofit firms other than for hospitals since the latter are only highly represented in only a few sectors, such as health care and education.
In sum, considering differences by ownership, there is a dime's worth of difference for Medicare. However, the hypothesis that for-profits engage in cost cutting at the expense of quality does not receive support. Compared to previous studies of hospitals, our analysis represents a major advance in measuring program costs and outcomes longitudinally, controlling for numerous health and other patient characteristics, with several many measures of relevant outcomes.
